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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-QUALIFICATIONS
CLAUSES-ELECTIONS---TERM LIMITS-CANDIDATES-The United
States Supreme Court held that term limits imposed by states
on United States congressional candidates violate the
Qualifications Clauses of the United States Constitution.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
Arkansas voters adopted a Term Limits Amendment
("Amendment 73") to the Arkansas Constitution in the
November 3, 1992 general election.' Amendment 73 places
limits on officials elected in Arkansas to both the Arkansas and
the United States governments.2 Section 3 of Amendment 73
prohibits the certification of candidacy for election to the United
States House of Representatives for any person who has
previously served three or more terms as a member of the
United States House of Representatives from Arkansas.'
Amendment 73 also prohibits the certification of candidacy for
1. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1845 (1995). The pur-
pose of Amendment 73 is stated in its preamble, which provides:
The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in
office too long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as
representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter partic-
ipation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive,
and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers.
Therefore, the people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein
limit the terms of the elected officials.
ARK. CONST. amend. 73 pmbl.
2. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1845-46. Section 1 of Amendment 73 limits an
elected official in the executive branch of the state government to two 4-year terms.
Id. Section 2 limits members of the Arkansas House of Representatives to three 2-
year terms and members of the Arkansas Senate to two 4-year terms. Id. at 1846.
3. Id. at 1846. Section 3 of Amendment 73 provides:
(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of
the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certi-
fied as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on
the ballot for election to the United States House of Representatives from
Arkansas.
(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member of the
United States Senate from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and
shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to
the United States Senate from Arkansas.
ARK. CONST. amend. 73, § 3.
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election to the United States Senate for any person who has
previously served two or more terms as a member of the United
States Senate.4
Bobbie Hill ("Hill") on behalf of herself and the League of
Women Voters filed suit in the Pulaski County Circuit Court
against incumbent state constitutional officers and legislators,
United States Senators and Representatives in office, the
Arkansas State Democratic Party, the Arkansas State
Republican Party and the State Board of Election
Commissioners seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating
Amendment 735 After a hearing on motions for summary
judgment, the court declared that section 3 of Amendment 73
violates the Qualifications Clauses' of the United States
Constitution.! Hill appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas,
where a five-to-two majority affirmed the decision and declared
section 3 of Amendment 73 unconstitutional8
The Attorney General of the State of Arkansas and the
intervenors filed a petition for a writ of certiorari9 to the United
4. ARK. CONST. amend. 73, § 3.
5. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Ark. 1994), affd
sub nom. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995). Hill was a
supporter of John Dawson, a State Representative who had served seven terms in
office. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 353. Additional interested parties intervened as
party-defendants, including the Arkansas State Attorney General's Office. Id. Organi-
zations joining as additional defendants included U.S. Term Limits, Inc., Arkansans
for Governmental Reform, and Americans for Term Limits. Id. An amended com-
plaint added Dick Herget ("Herget") as a party-plaintiff. Id. Herget was a supporter
of Ray Thornton ("Thornton"), a member of the United States Congress who had
served three terms in office. Id. Thornton also joined as a party-plaintiff. Id.
6. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 357. The qualifications for membership in the
United States Congress are set forth in Article I of the Constitution. The second
clause of section 2 provides: "No person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State
in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Article I also provides:
"No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Id. § 3, cl. 3.
7. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 357. The court also held that although the
issue was justiciable and section 3 is severable from the other provisions of the
amendment, the entire amendment is void because it lacks an "Enacting Clause." Id.
An enacting clause is a "clause at the beginning of a statute which states the au-
thority by which it is made." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 361. The Arkansas Supreme Court also af-
firmed on the issues of justiciability and severability, but reversed the circuit court's
holding that the absence of an enacting clause renders the amendment void. Id. at
354-55, 359.
9. A writ of certiorari is "[an order by the appellate court which is used by
that court when it has discretion on whether or not to hear an appeal from a lower
court .... If the writ is granted, then it has the effect of ordering the lower court
to certify the record and send it up to the higher court." BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY
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States Supreme Court.1" Both petitions were granted and
consolidated for argument."
The Court considered the related issues of whether states may
add to or alter the qualifications set forth in the Constitution
and if not, whether a ballot access restriction form in
Amendment 73 was an alteration of those qualifications.12 The
Court began its analysis of these issues by reviewing its
previous interpretations of the Qualifications Clauses in Powell
v. McCormack." Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
focused first on the historical background that led the Court to
the conclusion that the qualifications enumerated in the
Constitution are "fixed and unalterable."14 The Court explained
that the holding of Powell incorporates the principles of
democracy and history, reasoning that all members of a
democratic society should be eligible for election and also be able
to elect representatives of their choosing. 5  The Court
reaffirmed its holding in Powell before examining its application
to additional qualifications imposed by states. 8
The Court next addressed the argument that the imposition of
additional qualifications for members of Congress is a power
reserved to the states. 7 First, the Court identified the source of
the power to add qualifications, reasoning that because the
ratification of the Constitution marked the birth of the power to
set qualifications for membership in Congress, the states never
had possession of this power and could therefore not reserve
it."5 The Court drew further support for its view of the national
character of the power from clauses in the Constitution that
reflect the nature of federal power over Congress and the limited
delegation of powers to the states. 9 The Court concluded that
1609 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
11- Id.
12. Id.
13. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that a member of the United States Congress
who is not constitutionally ineligible for membership cannot be excluded by a con-
gressional committee).
14. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1849. The Court drew its conclusions from
Parliamentary practices and Constitutional Convention debates. Id. Justice Stevens
was joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at 1845.
15. Id. at 1848-51. Adam Clayton Powell ("Powell") was a member of the Unit-
ed States House of Representatives from New York who was excluded from office by
a congressional committee, despite his eligibility under the age, citizenship, and resi-
dency requirements, because he had wrongfully used government funds. Powell, 395
U.S. at 489-93.
16. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1852.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1854.
19. Id. at 1855. The Court specifically examined Article I, Section 6 of the
1996 1197
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states do not have the power to add qualifications because the
power has not been delegated to the states."0
The Court addressed additional historical evidence not
discussed in Powell to support its holding that states are
precluded from adding qualifications.2' The Framers' fear of the
abuse of state power provided the principal evidentiary basis for
the Court's belief that the Framers did not intend this power to
be in the hands of the states." The majority found further
support for its position in the absence of any discussion during
the ratification of the Constitution for reservation of the power
within the states,23  in past congressional practices,24  in
established principles of democracy" and in the past and
present practice of states to impose term limits only on state
officials, if at all."6
Constitution, which provides that salaries of members of Congress be "ascertained by
Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States," and the clauses in Articles
I and II, which delegate specific actions related to federal elections to the states. Id.
20. Id. at 1856.
21. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1856.
22. Id. at 1857.
23. Id. at 1859. The ratification debates addressed the question of term limits,
or rotation, extensively. Id. The Federalists argued vociferously against the rotation
system of the Articles of Confederation and for voters' unlimited rights to choose
their own representatives. Id. Several states, however, including New York and Vir-
ginia, proposed amendments to limit the number of terms a representative could
serve. Id. In all of the debates over the rotation issue, no proposal was set forth to
reserve that power for the states. See generally DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONsTrruTION (J. Elliot ed. 1863) (recounting the ratification debates).
24. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1861. Specifically, the Court referred to the
case of William McCreery, a United States Representative from Maryland who was
allowed to retain his office by resolution of Congress despite an alleged failure to
meet a requirement imposed by the state. Id. The Court noted that congressional
debates over the 1807 McCreery resolution pointed to the conclusion that states are
prohibited from imposing requirements above and beyond the requirements set forth
in the Constitution. Id. The Chairman of the House Committee on Elections stated
that "neither the State nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority to
add to those qualifications, so as to change them." Id. (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 1862-64. The Court echoed the values of the principles previously
described in Powell. Id. Specifically, the Court discussed the egalitarian ideal that
the people should choose who will govern them. Id. at 1862. The Court stressed the
centrality of this ideal in the framework of the government by stating: "[T]he Fram-
ers, in perhaps their most important contribution, conceived of a Federal Govern-
ment directly responsible to the people... and chosen directly, not by the States,
but by the people." Id. at 1863.
26. Id. at 1864-66. The Court pointed to several states, including New Hamp-
shire, Georgia, Delaware and South Carolina, that had state constitutional provisions
revised at the time of the ratification of the Constitution requiring that their state
representatives meet additional property requirements. Id. at 1865. The Court, how-
ever, explained: "In the revised Constitutions, each State retained property qualifica-
tions for its own state elected officials yet placed no property qualifications on its
congressional representatives." Id.
1198
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The Court rejected the argument that Amendment 73 does not
impose qualifications, but merely exercises Arkansas' right to
regulate the manner of elections.27 The Court held that
Amendment 73 is an indirect instrumentality used to accomplish
an unconstitutional goal.s The Court also rejected the
argument that Amendment 73's limitations are not absolute and
may be circumvented by a write-in campaign. 9
The Court concluded that the imposition of state-decided
qualifications proposed by Amendment 73 would so significantly
alter the structure of federal government that an amendment to
the Constitution would be required.30 The Court thus affirmed
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. 1
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stressed the
importance of separating American citizens' national political
identities from their state political identities." Justice Kennedy
reasoned that an erosion of the boundaries between the orders of
government would threaten the federal system.33  The
27. Id. at 1866-67. The Petitioners argued that section 3 of Amendment 73
does not impose any additional qualifications based on the Court's earlier reasoning
in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (holding that provisions of the California
Elections Code that require candidates to follow specific preliminary procedures do
not impose additional qualifications). The Court did not decide whether section 3 is
an additional qualification under Storer because it concluded that it is inherently
unconstitutional. Id. at 1867.
28. Id. at 1867. The Court drew upon language from Harman v. Forssenius,
380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)),
when it stated that "Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could
be . . . indirectly denied." Id.
29. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1868. The Court held that "an amendment
with the avowed purpose and obvious effect of evading the requirements of the
Qualifications Clauses by handicapping a class of candidates cannot stand." Id
30. Id. at 1871. The Court stated: "In the absence of a properly passed consti-
tutional amendment, allowing individual States to craft their own qualifications for
Congress would thus erode the structure envisioned by the Framers, a structure that
was designed, in the words of the Preamble to our Constitution, to form a 'more
perfect Union.' Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated: "In my view,
however, it is well settled that the whole people of the United States asserted their
political identity and unity of purpose when they created the federal system." Id.
33. Id. Justice Kennedy stressed the distinction between citizens' political iden-
tities when he stated:
[Tihe Constitution takes care both to preserve the States and to make use of
their identities and structures at various points in organizing the federal un-
ion. It does not at all follow from this that the sole political identity bf an
American is with the State of his or her residence. It denies the dual charac-
ter of the Federal Government which is its very foundation to assert that the
people of the United States do not have a political identity as well, one inde-
pendent of, though consistent with, their identity as citizens of the State of
their residence.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 34:1195
concurrence also questioned the logic of a power that would
prevent people from exercising their right to vote for a candidate
simply because they had previously voted for the candidate.'
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas reasoned that the
Constitution is silent about the power of states to add
qualifications.3 5 Thus, the dissent concluded that states are not
prohibited from exercising this power.3" The dissent relied on
the principle that the power of government stems from the
people.37 The dissent further asserted that the people's will is
manifested through the exercise of power by individual states."
Justice Thomas rejected the majority's interpretation of the
Tenth Amendment3" and substituted his own interpretation,
concluding that no power could be withheld from the states
without a specific limitation.4
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the Framers of
the Constitution intended to provide a connection between the
people and their representatives.4" However, the dissent argued
that this link exists only between representatives from each
state and that state's population.42 The dissent then rejected
the majority's characterization of the states' rights described in
the Times, Places and Manner Clause of the Constitution as a
34. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1874. Justice Kennedy explained the illogical
result of a process in which after selecting a candidate to support, voters would be
barred from continuing to support their chosen candidate because they had previous-
ly voted for the candidate. Id.
35. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent found that the Consti-
tution does not address the question of whether states can prescribe eligibility re-
quirements for congressional candidates. Id.
36. Id. Because the Constitution is silent on the matter of state-imposed re-
quirements, the dissent concluded that: "[W]here the Constitution is silent, it raises
no bar to action by the States or the people." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The dissent noted that this contention was based on established na-
tional practices focused on the states, such as elections of members of Congress,
electoral college membership, and ratification of constitutional amendments. Id. at
1877.
39. The Tenth Amendment states: '"The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, not prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. XL
40. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1877. Justice Thomas explained his interpreta-
tion of the Tenth Amendment: "[The Amendment does make clear that powers re-
side at the state level except where the Constitution removes them from that level.
All powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor
prohibits to the States are controlled by the people of each State." Id. at 1876.
41. Id. at 1881.
42. Id. Justice Thomas did not reach a firm conclusion about whether the
nature of a congressional member's allegiance after election is with the nation as a
whole or with an individual state, but distinctly concluded that the states have ex-
clusive control over the process of selecting congressional members. Id.
1200
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delegation of power.' Instead, Justice Thomas asserted that
the states' "right" is merely a duty imposed on states."
At the same time, Justice Thomas disagreed with the
majority's holding that Amendment 73 violates the
Qualifications Clauses of the Constitution.' The dissent
contended that the Qualifications Clauses only establish
minimum requirements and prevent total abolition of
requirements for membership in Congress." Justice Thomas
agreed with the majority position that Congress does not have
the power to add qualifications for its members.47 However,
Justice Thomas did not agree that the Framers intended this
limitation to extend to the states.' The dissent also relied on
historical evidence to arrive at its conclusion that the
Qualifications Clauses are not exclusive. 9
The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding that the
distinction between Amendment 73 being an absolute bar to re-
election and merely being an obstacle is irrelevant 0 and
questioned why the majority's analysis of the Qualifications
Clauses was affected by the intent of Amendment 73.51 Justice
Thomas asserted that he would not construe the Qualifications
Clauses to prohibit state powers in any manner beyond their
43. rd. at 1883. The Times, Places and Manner Clause states: "The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
44. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1883.
45. Id. at 1884.
46. Id. at 1885.
47. Id. at 1889. Justice Thomas stated that the restriction preventing members
of Congress from adding qualification requirements to its own members does not
stem from restrictive language in the Qualifications Clauses, but rather from the
absence of a constitutional provision afifi-matively granting Congress such power. Id
48. Id. at 1890. Justice Thomas argued that the states could authorize their
state legislators to prescribe qualifications. Id. at 1890-91.
49. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1890-908. The dissent examined the Constitu-
tional Convention, the Federalist papers, the ratification debates and state practices.
Id.
50. Id. at 1910. Justice Thomas argued that Amendment 73 does not create
absolute term limits, but rather establishes a procedure by which candidates covered
in the amendment would have to win by write-in votes. Id at 1908. Justice Thomas
further questioned the studies showing write-in victories to be practically impossible
and pointed out differing studies in which candidates not from the fringe had suc-
cessfully waged write-in campaigns. Id. at 1909-10.
51. Id. at 1911. Justice Thomas explained: "If a law does not in fact add to
the constitutional qualifications, the mistaken expectations of the people who enacted




An examination of the constitutionality of limitations on
congressional qualifications must begin by understanding the
status of this area at the time the Constitution was drafted. In
1764, Great Britain's Parliament declared one of its members
ineligible despite satisfaction of standing requirements." This
declaration raised the question of Parliament's power to
effectively add qualifications and led to the establishment of the
rule that qualifications for membership in Parliament are "fixed"
by law and are not "occasional."' The controversy concerned
John Wilkes ("Wilkes"), a member of the House of Commons
who had committed libel and had been expelled from Parliament
because of his libelous activities.55 Wilkes was later re-elected
three times, but each time Parliament declared him ineligible."
In 1782, the House of Commons expunged resolutions declaring
Wilkes ineligible.57 Parliament's control over the qualifications
of its members was effectively limited to the laws providing
standing requirements.5
The American Constitutional Convention convened five years
after Wilkes' victory in Parliament. One of the issues facing the
Framers was whether to adopt a system of rotation in the
legislative branch of the federal government similar to that
contained in the Articles of Confederation.59 The Constitution
did not adopt such a rotation system, but limited the number of
years in a term of membership. 0 The Framers considered
including qualifications such as property ownership," but
adopted only those qualifications set forth in the Qualifications
52. Id. at 1913-14.
53. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527-32 (1969) (citing 22 PARLIAMENTA-
RY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1411 (1782)) (discussing the controversy and how it relates
to the issue of imposing additional qualifications for members of the legislature).
54. Powell, 395 U.S. at 528 (citing 16 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND
590 (1769)).
55. Id. at 527 (citing 15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1393 (1764)).
Wilkes had published a highly critical attack on a British peace treaty with France
in which he alleged charges of bribery, despotism, and corruption. Id. (citing R.
POSTAGE, THAT DEVIL WILKES (1929)).
56. Id. at 528 (citing 16 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 545).
57. Id. (citing 22 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1411).
58. Id. at 529 (citing T. MAY, PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 66 (T. Webster ed.,
13th ed. 1924)).
59. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V (1777). The Articles provided a
limit on terms of state representatives: "[N]o person shall be capable of being a
delegate for more than three years in any term of six years." Id.
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; ld. § 3, cl. 1.
61. See generally 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max
Farrand ed. 1911) (recounting the Constitutional Convention debates).
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Clauses pertaining to age, citizenship, and residency.62
An extensive analysis of the exclusivity of the Qualifications
Clauses was set forth by the Supreme Court in Powell v.
McCormack." The issue before the Court in Powell was
whether either House of Congress has the authority to exclude
an elected member who meets the requirements of the relevant
Qualifications Clause." The Court held that the only
membership qualifications that Congress can judge are those
standing qualifications enumerated in the Constitution."5
The Powell opinion concerned Adam Clayton Powell
("Powell"), a Representative from New York elected to the 90th
Congress. 8 Despite Powell's satisfaction of the requirements for
congressional membership set forth in the Constitution, the
House of Representatives passed a resolution excluding Powell
from his seat in the House because of reports that Powell had
wrongfully diverted House funds and had made false reports on
personal spending.67 The Supreme Court examined both the
historical context of the Qualifications Clauses and the
democratic principles inherent in United States Government and
concluded that the House of Representatives could not exclude
Powell because he was an elected member who met all of the
constitutional requirements.68 The Court held that the standing
qualifications set forth in the Constitution are exclusive and
unalterable, absent a constitutional amendment."
The Court addressed a different aspect of the Qualifications
Clauses in Storer v. Brown.7" The issue in Storer was whether
the portion of the California Elections Code preventing ballot
access to independent candidates who had failed to disaffiliate
within a qualified period is constitutional.7 The Supreme Court
62. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; Id. § 3, cl. 3. See supra note 6 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the Qualifications Clauses.
63. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
64. Powell, 395 U.S. at 495.
65. Id. at 550.
66. Id. at 489.
67. Id. at 492-93.
68. Id. at 521.
69. Powell, 395 U.S. at 521.
70. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
71. Storer, 415 U.S. at 726-28. The constitutionality of the provisions was
challenged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Qualifications
Clauses of the Constitution. Id. at 727. The California Elections Code provide an ad-
ditional challenged requirement to independent candidates for the filing of nomina-
tion papers signed by 5-6% of eligible voters obtained at least 24 days after the
primary and 60 days before the general election. Id. The Court remanded this part
of the case involving the voter signatures for determination of the constitutionality of
the severity of this ballot access restriction. Id. at 746.
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held that although these provisions constitute an absolute bar to
some candidates, the provisions are valid because they do not
operate to deprive candidates of any constitutional rights.72 The
rationale used by Justice White in the Court's opinion to uphold
the constitutionality of the election provision involving
disaffiliation demonstrates that the challenged provisions do not
operate to add qualifications to candidates.73
The Court did not directly address the issue of the
Qualifications Clauses again until 1993 in Nixon v. United
States.74 In Nixon, the Court distinguished its holding in Powell
regarding the justiciability of a review of the House of
Representatives' exclusion procedure from the nonjusticiable
issue presented in Nixon. In Nixon, Walter L. Nixon ("Nixon"),
former Chief Judge of the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, challenged the constitutionality of a
Senate Rule employed to impeach him.7" The Court explained
that its holding in Powell found the qualifications of House
membership to be "of a precise, limited nature" as specified by
the Constitution.7" Congress had exceeded its constitutional
authority in Powell, the Court explained, and a judicial review of
the authority was necessary; whereas in Nixon no such
additional authority had been exercised.77  The Court's
interpretation of the Powell holding, as explained in Nixon,
reiterated the Supreme Court's view of the fixed nature of
qualifications for membership in Congress.7"
The Supreme Court's decision in Term Limits is especially
notable when contrasted with other decisions handed down
during the Court's October 1994 Term because of its perspective
on the scope and definition of federalism and federal power. In a
Term in which the Court's most significant decisions effectively
limited the power of the federal government,7" the Term Limits
72. 1I at 737.
73. Id. at 746. The Court dismissed the argument that additional qualifications
were imposed by these provisions as "wholly without merit .... The non-affiliation
requirement no more establishes an additional requirement for . . . office . . . than
the requirement that the candidate win the primary to secure a place on the gener-
al ballot or otherwise demonstrate substantial community support." Id. at 746 n.16.
74. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
75. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 734.
76. Id. at 740.
77. Id-
78. Id
79. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to invalidate federal criminal statutes
is limited); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that
all federal, state, and local racial classifications must be reviewed under a strict
scrutiny standard of review); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (holding
1204 Vol. 34:1195
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decision stands apart in its denial of an expansion of recognized
state power.
The decisive vote which determined the outcome of Term
Limits was cast by Justice Kennedy. s0 An analysis of the Term
Limits decision must carefully examine Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in order to understand the reason that his vote was
for the limitation of state power. Justice Kennedy's primary
focus was on the very nature of federalism and its place in the
political identity of the people of the United States."' Justice
Kennedy's definition of federalism emphasized the importance of
separating state and federal power.82 Justice Kennedy asserted
that this separation of power is inherent in the separation of
American citizens' political identities.s' American citizens
identify with their states and with their country." Justice
Kennedy asserted that the American citizen's national political
identity can only retain its legitimacy if it is controlled without
interference from states.88 It is this aspect of Justice Kennedy's
that a district court's remedial power in desegregation actions is limited to eliminat-
ing racial discrimination in public schools and had been exceeded by a district
court's ordering of funding to improve desegregation); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995) (holding that the Justice Department had exceeded its statutory authori-
ty under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) by forcing a state to create new congressional districts).
80. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The majority in
Lopez, Adarand, Jenkins, and Miller consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Kennedy, O'Connor, Thomas and Scala. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624;
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2038; Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2097; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at
2475.
81. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1872.
82. Id. Justice Kennedy described the Framers' creation of the system of fed-
eralism as:
It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political ca-
pacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.
The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct rela-
tionship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the
people who sustain it and are governed by it.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Justice Kennedy explained that these two identities are necessary to
the federalist system of government: "It denies the dual character of the Federal
Government which is its very foundation to assert that the people of the United
States do not have a political identity as well, one independent of, though consistent
with, their identity as citizens of the State of their residence." Id.
85. Id. Justice Kennedy drew authority for this proposition from the Supreme
Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding
that states cannot interfere with federal power). Id. Justice Kennedy distinguished
his position in Lopez from his position in Term Limits by explaining that the pro-
posed term limits amendment presented the opposite problem from Lopez. Id. at
1873. Justice Kennedy explained that in Term Limits a state was encroaching on
matters reserved to the federal government by the term limits amendment, whereas
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opinion that seems to explain his vote on the constitutionality of
Amendment 73. Preserving the sanctity of the federal
government's freedom to operate independently of state
interference appears to be the concern that shifted Justice
Kennedy's alliance in Term Limits.
A complete analysis of the Court's holding in Term Limits
must explore the limitations of the holding. The specific holding
in Term Limits can be better understood when contrasted with
the Court's holding in Storer. It is important to address the
Storer decision in an analysis of the Term Limits decision
because of a crucial distinction between the two cases.
Proponents of Arkansas' Amendment 73 and other similar
statutes in other states attempt to fit term limits into the same
category as the Storer disaffiliation provisions in order to avoid
classification as additional qualifications. The threshold for
determining the constitutionality of such provisions, however, is
whether constitutional rights are directly or indirectly violated.
The Court examined the intent behind the drafting of
Amendment 73 in determining exactly whose constitutional
rights are violated and the manner in which they are violated."G
The Court weakly distinguished between the provisions in Storer
and Amendment 73 by using a test of constitutionality which is
difficult to define.
Despite its practical effect, the Term Limits decision has
caused a significant uproar by demonstrating how close the
United States system of government came to complete upheaval.
A five-to-four vote in favor of state-imposed congressional term
limits would have shifted an enormous amount of power out of
the hands of the federal government. A new system of
democracy would have arisen, with individual states as the
centers of decision-making. The stark disagreement between the
majority and the dissent over the established history and basic
in Lopez, the federal government was encroaching on matters reserved to states in
enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Id.
86. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1867-68. The Court found that "it cannot be se-
riously contended that the intent behind Amendment 73 is other than to prevent the
election of incumbents." Id.
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concepts of the Constitution raised interesting questions which
will factor into upcoming elections and subsequent appointments
to the Supreme Court, as well as upcoming decisions before the
Supreme Court.87
Ann R. Dickson
87. Notably, the effects of the Term Limits decision may be felt in Romer v.
Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995) (granting certiorari), in which the Court granted cer-
tiorari and heard oral arguments on October 10, 1995 to decide the constitutionality
of Colorado's voter-initiated constitutional amendment prohibiting laws which protect
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
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